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Our Common FUIUI'e, better known as the Brundtland 
Report, is on of the most influential books of the past 
twenty years. This publication put the concept of 
sustainable development on the United Nations agenda 
as well as on the public policy agenda of virtually every 
nation in the world. 
Two other books have had substantial impact on the 
integration of economics and ecology and promotion of 
intra and intergenerational equity. A Blueprint for a 
Green Economy (1989), prepared for the Government of 
The United Kingdom by Pearce and his colleagues, 
focuses on the extension of neo-classical economics 
incorporating environmental matters into economic 
decision-making. 
The other book, For the Common Good (1989), by 
economist Herman Daly and theologian John Cobb, 
while accepting the value of market principles, calls for 
a reconstruction of the paradigm 'that both clarifies the 
excellence of its past work and sets it in a larger context' 
(p 19). The 1arger context' is a vision of an economic 
order which is 1ust. participatory, and sustainable' - an 
economy which serves the community. 
It is likely that history will come to regard these books 
as a turning point in the evolution of public policy. No 
longer will it be possible to argue that there are not 
environmental-economic interdependencies and no 
longer will important decisions pertaining to the use of 
the environment be taken without at least some 
consideration of their impacts far into the futme. The 
concept of scarcity has been extended to oceans and the 
atmosphere (the global commons), to rivers and streams, 
the air above our cities, and to the remaining wilderness. 
This new perspective brings an enormous challenge for 
economists, social scientists, ecologists, and 
philosophers. The evolution of the concept of 
sustainable development within economics has come a 
long and circuitous route. A few historical snapshots 
illustrate this. 
Views from the past 
In 1776 Adam Smith argued that economies have their 
own laws of motion and that through the 'invisible hand' 
of the market and fundamental laws of behaviour they 
are capable of indefinite improvement. Heilbroner 
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(1980:57) summarised this perspective: 'Adam Smith's 
wcdd went slowly, quite willingly, and more or less 
inevitably, to Valballa-. 
A few }'earS 1alf2' in 1798, Reverend Thomas Malthus 
published An essay Oil the principle of populatibn as it 
affects the juJun improvelltDll of society. His basic 
thesis was that tbe Iuman prospect was 'meagre, dreary, 
and chilling'. There was a tendency, Malthus argued, for 
population to OUlSirip all possible means of subsistence. 
Ricardo, best known fa his development of the theory 
of rent (Principia cf Political Economy, 1817), was in 
agreement with Maltbus on tbe population issue, but on 
little else, and argued that the margin of cultivation 
would be continUally pushed out on to poorer and poorer 
soils. 
The indUSlrial revolutiJo and the laissez-faire capitalism 
of the early 19th cennry were to spawn ideas and social 
movements which, to some extent, can be considered 
precursors to their m00em COWlterparts. The historical 
roots of p-esent day concerns with distributional and 
equity issues are realily traced to the thinkers and 
activists of this era. 
J S Mill gave the wadi a more compassionate economic 
and social order tban mat suggested by the laissez-faire 
capitalism of tbe 19m century. Mill showed that 
distributioo was sepanue from production; that society 
could determine bow it wanted to distribute the goods 
the economy produced rather than being a mechanistic 
function of the economy, and that through education and 
social policies a beUet world was possible. The mixed 
economies of today Olie much to Mill. 
There is one ocher work of the last century which 
deserves mention. It is The rheory of the leiSID'e class, 
published in 1899. Tile autbor, Thorstein Veblen, was 
according to Heilbrmer, 'the last man who knew 
everything'. His ability to span disciplines is 
prerequisite to fonmlating sustainable development 
policies. Since Veblen's time this has become much 
more difficult as a ronsequence of the explosion of 
knowledge and sepamion of intellectual pursuits into 
narrow disciplines. \-13 biting satire, Veblen exposed 
the 'conspicuous cons:mlptioo' of the new rich. Some 
would argue that a 'demonstration effect' has penneated 
through to all leve!s of ~iety and that modem 
consumerism has rrnch to do with conspicuous 
consumption. 
These ideas illustrate that the modern concept of 
sustainable development can be tiaCed back to a much 
earlier period, although not specifically addressing the 
modern economics-ecology interface. Economists must 
now turn to the development of natural resources and 
environmental economics. 
Milestones In sustainable development 
There is no one point in time which marks the start of 
environmental economics. In 1920 Piqou suggested that 
individuals had 'defective telescopic faculty' - and that 
government intervention might be needed to give 
adequate weight to the welfare of future gener.uions. He 
also suggested that effects such as pollution, which are 
not included in market transactions, required measures 
which equate social and private costs and benefits. 
In 1936, legislation by the US Congress - the US Flood 
Control Act of 1936 - enunciated the principle of 
comparing the costs and benefits of development 
proposals. It was not until 20 yems later that a number 
of economic publications suggested fairly clear cost-
benefit criteria for water resource projects (see Eckstein, 
1958; McKean, 1958; Krutilla and Eckstein, 1958). 
Of similar significance was the publication in 1954 of 
Scott Gordon's seminal work The economic theory of a 
common property resource: the fzshery. This led to the 
development of fiSheries economics and, vecy 
importantly, to bio-economics. The latter is to date tbe 
most ambitious - and some might argue, successful -
attempt to integrate economics and biology. The 
essential message in Scott Gordon's work was that open 
access to a common property resource would lead to 
over-use in both an ecological and economic sense. 
The fact that many environmental effects of 
development projects were not measured in the cost-
benefit studies of the 1960s led to the formulation of a 
new tool: the environmental impact assessment 
Environmental impact assessment literature of this era 
defined 'environment' very broadly and emphasised 
cumulative, induced, irreversible and long-tenn impacts. 
A systems approach to identifying and measwing 
impacts was needed. A major contribution in 
developing a systems approach is that of Hufschmidt et 
al (1983). In Environment, nalUral sysums and 
development: an economic valuation guide, tbey argue 
that to consider economic growth and environmental 
. quality as alternatives is misleading: 
'Deforestation and the resulting soil erosion 
undermine the agricultural base of an economy 
and reduce long-tenn growth prospects. 
Pollution of coastal waters can destroy 
commercial fisheries and can also check 
economic growth. Air pollution affects human 
health with a resultant loss in productive effort 
as well as direct welfare losses to individuals. 
Even when deterioration of environmental 
quality does not lead to reduced capacity to 
produce conventional goods and services, 
natural-systems services that are consumed 
directly, such as recreation, are affected and the 
objective of development - improved human 
welfare - is undermined. For these reasons, it is 
of utmost importance that the effects on natural 
systems of development projects and programs 
be carefully analyzed. Such analysis is not a 
luxmy, but must become an essential part of 
project formulation and evaluation if protection 
is to be provided to the natural-resource base 
that sustains human welfare' (Hufschmidt et al, 
1983:1-2). 
Defining sustainable development 
OliT Common Future maintains that the needs of the 
present generation should be met without compromising 
tbe ability of future generations to meet their own needs. 
lbe Chairman of the Commission, Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, (quoted in Pearce et al, 1989:174-5) has 
expanded on the concept: 
There are inany dimensions to sustainability. 
First, it requires an elimination of poverty and 
deprivation. Second, it requires the 
conservation and enhancement of the resource 
base which alone can ensure that the 
elimination of the poverty is permanent Third, 
it requires a broadening of the concept of 
development so that it covers not only 
economic growth but also social and cultural 
development Fourth, and most important, it 
requires the unification of economics and 
ecology in decision-making at all levels'. 
OliT Common Future addresses these dimensions. 
Pean:e et . al give most attention to the unification of 
economics and ecology. Daly and Cobb primarily focus 
on broadening the concept of development. 
Tbe work of Brundtland and Pearce et al suggest that the 
ethical principle entailed in sustainable development is 
the Rawlsian principle, based on the notion that justice is 
equated with a bias in resource allocation to the least 
advantaged. As Pearce et al (1990:14) state: 
'Such a rule could emerge from a constitution 
drawn up by individuals brought together under 
a 'veil of ignorance' about where in society they 
would be allocated. Risk aversion dictates that 
the constitution-makers would avoid 
disadvantaging certain groups for fear that they 
themselves would be allocated to those groups. 
The intergenerational variant of the Rawls 
outcome simply extends the veil of ignorance to 
the intertemporal context in which each 
generation is ignorant of the time period to 
which it will be allocated'. 
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Tisdell (1990) argues: 
'However, once one adopts Rawls' principle one 
must not only apply it between generations but 
also within them for it also implies that a 
similar degree of equality is just ~-ween 
existing individuals. In particular it would 
seem to imply on a global scale that much 
larger income ttansfers should be made from 
developed to less developed nations than those 
now or likely to take place in the foreseeable 
future'. 
Other economists have suggested somewhat different 
ethical principles for the attainment of sustainable 
development Daly and Cobb suggest that the basic goal 
is to ensure the survival of the human species for as long 
as it is compatible with God's will. Georgescu-Roegen 
(1976) also focuses on long term survival of the human 
species. He bases his prescription for sustainable 
development on the inexorable workings of the entropy 
law. He suggests the best prospect for long term human 
survival is to reduce population to a level which can be 
supported by the use of renewable resources alone. 
Tisdell (1990), in commenting on this work, aslcs 
whether Georgescu-Roegen has taken the concept of 
sustainability to extremes and poses a number of 
questions regarding the application of the Rawlsian 
theory of justice: 
'Should only human beings count ... in 
determining what is just? If we could have 
been born as any other individual could we not 
have been born as any other living thing, say an 
animal of some type? ... Could •.• an Australian 
be born an Indian? What difference does it 
make to the application of Rawls' theory if one 
believes in reincarnation as do the Buddhists 
and Hindus?' 
It would seem that defining sustainable development is 
an ethical issue and in practical terms acceptance of the 
concept is a political matter. What is clear, 
notwithstanding the differences indicated above, is that 
the fundamental ethical principle adopted is 
intergenerational equity. 
lntrageneratlonal equHy 
Brundtland deals with intragenerational equity at some 
length. This is understandable if north-south issues 
permeate much of the sustainable development debate. 
More fundamentally, the report makes the link between 
poverty, population growth and environmental 
degradation. The very poor, under-developed nations 
are 1ocked-in' to continued over-utilization of their soils, 
pollution of their over-crowded cities and population 
growth. According to Brunddand. there must be a 
reform of international trading practices. In particular, 
protectionism in industrialised countries must be 
dismantled, because this depresses international prices of 
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products which are importmt export earners for many 
developing coontries. 
Brunddand looks forwant to a 'sustainable world 
econpmy' in wbid1 free world trade is a prerequisite, as 
is eConomic growth (within ecological limits): 
'If large parts of the developing world are to 
avert economic, ~ and environmental 
calaStropbes. it is essential that global economic 
growth be revitalised. In practical terms, this 
means JD<Xe l3pi.d economic growth in both 
industrial and developing countries, lower 
interest mtes. greater ledmology transfer, and 
sigoificandy larger capital flows, both 
coocessiooalamd COIJJJDCICial ••• 
1be Commission's ovemll assessment is that the 
intematiooal economy must speed up world 
growth while respecting the environmental 
constraints' (1987:89). 
Brunddand's argument for economic development is: 
'Economic development generates resources 
that can be used to improve education and 
health. These improvements, along with 
associated social changes, reduce both fertility 
and mortality rates. On the other hand, high 
rates of population growth that eat into 
surpluses available for economic and social 
development can hinder improvements in 
education and health' (1987:96). 
Brunddand also calls for the removal of price distortions 
and the implementation of land reforms within 
develqjng nations. Attention is drawn to government 
policies which subsidise food in cities and result in 
migration from rural areas. 
· In their book Sustaillable development: economics and 
enviro~~~~tent in ~ Third World, Pearce et al (1990) 
address the intragenerational issues in more formal 
economic terms. lbey prescribe minimum conditions 
for sUS1ainable development based on the 'constancy of 
the natural capilal stock'. This concept requires 
elaboration. A broad view is that the total value of all 
capital SIOCks, man-made and natural, be held constant. 
Crucial to this view is perfect substitutability between 
man-made and namral capital. Pearce et al argue that a 
constant capilal stock 'is likely to serve the goal of 
intrageoentiooal fairness - ie justice to the socially 
disadvantaged both within any one country and between 
countries at a given point in time'. This they argue is 
clearly the case in the poor countries, but less obvious 
for the developed countries. 
Daly and Cobb also concern themselves with the 
particular aspects of intmgenerational equity in the 
context of sustainable development but they do much 
more. Their book is about fairness. They, like J S Mill, 
reiterate that an economically efficient allocation does 
not imply a just distribution. Daly and Cobb state: 
'Historical conditions of property ownership are 
major detenninants of income distribution and 
have little to do with either efficiency or justice. 
These two values can conflict. and the market 
does not automatically resolve this conflict 
This is recognised by eoonomists today, but 
there still exists a residual feeling from the 
heyday of marginal productivity theory •.• that 
the market rewards everyone in close 
proportion to his or her contribution to the total 
product It is simply incorrect •• .' (1989:59). 
These authors recognise the need for incentives if the 
market is to function. They are strong supporterS of the 
market and explicitly argue against centralised economic 
planning. They do not resolve the question of what is a 
just distribution, nor what the rewards have to be for a 
market to function. They ultimately rely on Christian 
notions of fairness. · 
lntergeneratlonal equity 
Constant capital 
Fundamental to unravelling the constant capital issue is 
a better scientific understanding of the role natural 
capital (soils, forests, water, etc) as a factor of 
production, and as a direct comumption good (for those 
who directly use natural ecosystems for recreation, or 
value them for their intrinsic auributes). 
Natural capital differs from man-made capital in that the 
latter can be increased or decreased at will while the 
former can be decreased but not increased. Pearce et al 
suggest that 'natural and man-made capital are 
substitutes only to a limited extent'. The issue of 
substitutability is only part of the story once natural and 
man-made capital are viewed as complements. This 
view runs. throughout the Brunddand Report We ought 
not think in terms of a dichotomy between economic 
development and environmental protection; sustainable 
development suggests we can have both, within limits. 
Discounting 
1bere is probably no more poorly understood or 
contentious issue than that of discounting the future. 
Non-economists are likely to blame economists for 
inventing the concept This is not the case. Economists 
are observing the behaviour of individuals, who, for a 
variety of reasons, in their economic behaviour tend to 
favour the present rather than the future. 
'It may not be too unfair to suggest that 
previous models of the development process 
have tended to assume that the "future will look 
after itself", whereas the sustainable 
development approach acknowledges that the 
ability of the future to do this can be seriously 
impaired by actioo taken now. In this sense, 
sustainaNe development does not give greater 
weight 10 tbe furore lban other development 
approacbes: it simply points out that the factual 
assumptioo tbat fubJre generations would be 
able to choose as freely as a cmrent generation 
is DOt likely to be correct' (Pearce et al, 
1990:19}. 
There is no curect discount rate: 
'The issues are complex, involving 
philosopbical and economic considerations that 
cannot be simplified without danger of 
trivialization. Howe~. they ••• lie at the centre 
of tbe intellcctual debate on the balance 
between the Deeds of present and future 
genel'alioos _ Wbat value the discount rate 
should take~ been the subject of much debate 
among CQ)Il()ll1ists _ the two basic candidates 
are the COfWIIIIIPtio" rate of interest, which is 
based on the rate of time preference and the 
opportunity COSl if capital, which is based on 
the marginal productivity of capital. In the 
simplest of tconomies ••. the levels of savings 
and invesuneot would adjust, so that the two 
rates are equal •.. But real world economies are 
more complex ... and tbe two rates diverge, 
with the opportunity cost of capital being ... 
higher ·- thete is no generally agreed way of 
deterring the discomt rate' (op cit. 23-25). 
Box 1 presents in summary fonn the rationale for 
discounting, 3ld arguments for and against 
Disregarding a fairly important point - that we do not 
know what the oor:rect discount rate is - the conventional 
wisdom withm economics is not to adjust the discount 
rate. Ooce we recngnise that project appraisal is not 
intended to address intergenerational equity issues, we 
can put aside the umesolvable debate on discounting and 
look for practical rules. 
"' .. 
Over the yea-s, many economists have suggested that 
environmental coosttaints be applied to development 
projects and that lbese should over-ride the discounting 
rule. · Ciriacy-Waotrup (1952) has argued for safe 
minimum staadards since 1952. Bishop. (1978), and 
Pearce et al (1989, 1990) have argued for environmental 
constraints and defining the rights of future generations 
and using these to circumscribe cost-benefit analysis. · 
Once again we have to twn to ethics. 
The market and sustainable development 
I have referre.:i, in me main, to three major works which 
are changing the public policy agenda in ways that few 
other intellect:aal offerings have in recent decades. None 
however are ~ a radical departure from the 
prevailing ethl:al1Dlderpinnings of modem society. 
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Box 1: The rationale for discounting - arguments for and against 
Arguments for: Arguments against: 
I 
Pure time preference 
Individuals are impatient and prefer the present 10 the Individual lime preference is not nec;cssarily consistent 
future with lifetime welfare maximisation 
Society is the sum of individuals, therefore society Discowtting, because of impatience, is irrational(a) 
prefers the present 10 the future 
What individuals want is not necessarily what society 
People's preferences should C01Ult (the neo-classical should want (rejection of the individualistic liberal 
ethical principle) value judgement) 
Individuals make decisions in two contexts, private and 
social (social/community decisions are alU'Uistic and 
consider future generations) 
It is a satisfaction of wants as they arise that matters: 
tomorrow's satisfaction matters, not IOday's assessment 
of tomorrow's satisfaction(b) 
Risk and uncertainty . 
A benefit or cost is valued less the more 1Ulcertain Individuals are mortal, society is not 
its occurrence(c) 
Social decisions are less risky than private decisions 
Uncertainty increases with lime 
Preferences for food, shelter, water and energy are 
Risk that an individual will not be alive to benefit in the certain( d) 
future 
There is uncertainty about future preferences 
Diminishing marginal utility of consumption 
In a growing economy, consumption increases over lime Only applicable if real consumption per capita can be 
and people are better off (the more one has in the reliably expected to increase (not necessarily the case) 
future. the less one is likely to sacrifice today 10 obtain 
even more in the future) Constraints prevent individuals from acting in a 
'normal' way (the poor have no choice but to focus on 
tomorrow's meal) 
Opportunity cost of capital 
Capital is productive (investing a S1 now "';UJead to S1 H the cost of environmental degradation was 
plus in a year's time) internalised, productivity growth might be negative (this 
suggests negative discount rates) 
Notes: 
(a) This perspective has a long history in economic thought (ie Jcvons, 1871; Bohm-Bawhrk, 1884; Ramsey, 1929; 
Piqou, 1932). 
(b) Goodin, 1986. 
(c) This has been argued since Bentham, 1789 . 
. (d) Barry. 19n 
Source: Adopted from Pearce et al (1989 ar.d 1990) and Daly and Cobb (1989). 
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The most radical of the contributions is that of Daly and 
Cobb. Nevertheless, how radical is a call to return to 
Christian ethics! They are ftrmly wedded to the 
principles of the market, as opposed to cenb'al planning, 
but fmd fault with the real world workings of rruuket 
capitalism and do not favour complete laissez-faire. 
They argue that there is a tendency for the market 'to 
erode its own requirements' and suggest three ways in 
which this occurs: a tendency for monopoly power to 
increase over time; the markets' inability to deal 
effectively with externalities and public goods; and its 
effect in depleting moral capital. Only by focusing on 
this aspect of their work does one fully appreciate their 
charter for a new society. 
'Somewhat analogous to the tendency of the 
market to erode its own competitive 
foundations is the corrosive effect of 
individualistic self-interest on the containing 
moral context of the community. However 
much driven by self-interest. the market still 
depends absolutely on a community that shares 
such values as honesty, freedom, initiative, 
thrift, and other virtues whose authority will not 
long withstand the reduction to the level of 
personal tastes that is explicit in the positivist, 
individualistic philosophy of value on which 
modem economic theory is based. If all value 
derives only from satisfaction of individual 
wants, then there is nothing left over on the 
basis of which self-interested, individualistic 
want satisfaction can be restrained. Depletion 
of moral capital may be more costly than 
depletion of physical capital, as Fred Hirsch has 
argued in The social limits to growth (1976). 
The marlcet does not accumulate moral capital; 
it depletes it Consequently, the market 
depends on the coinmunity to regenerate moral 
capital, just as it depends on the biosphere to 
regenerate natural capital. 
Unfortunately, the market as a category of 
economic thought abstracts from the 
community and the biosphere. As a result these 
issues do not gain attention within the 
discipline of economics. Yet in the real world, 
failure to respect the limits of both social and 
biophysical community is the greatest threat to 
a market society' (Daly and Cobb, 1989:50-51). 
To work towards sustainable development has 
implications for how economic well-being is measured 
in a market economy. The fU'St point to note is that it is 
economic, as opposed to fi1UU1Cial, results which are of 
concern. The two can differ, and the difference causes 
confusion. Financial measures result from proftt and 
loss statements of ftrms or individuals and these reflect a 
range of influences (such as existing taxes/subsidies, 
depreciation rules, interest rates, etc) which can differ 
from the economist's optimum. Spillover effects, both 
negative and positive, do not enter into the calculus. 
Economists need to adjust for all such influences. 
The second issue is tbat the existing technique foy 
measuring and reporting oo changes in economic well-
being, Gross National Product (GNP), does not do this 
adequately. This issue is discussed in both Pearce et al 
and Daly and Cobb in some detail. The main areas of 
measurement error are: the inclusion of the costs of 
pollution abatement by households as gains; unmitigated 
environmental degradalion is not subtracted; and 
depreciation of natural capital is not subtracted. 
Incorporating sustainable development into standard 
decisioo-making poses problems additional to 
discounting. The setting of a consuaint on depletion and 
degradation of the stock of .natural capital could mean 
that few projects would be feasible. 
The solution. as suggested by Pearce et al (1990:127-8), 
is that at the program level there should be some projects 
that enhance the natural environment to compensate for 
those 'that harm it'. The overall result should be zero 
damage. The. practicalities of implementing this 
compensating project approach require further 
consideration. The achievement of sustainability is even 
more complex where the project is the exploitation of 
non-renewable resources. It is obvious that this type of 
project would not be pennitted if v.-e imposed a 
constraint which did not allow depletion; furthermore, it 
is impractical to argue for no depletion. The solution is. 
to use some of the profits for invesunents which bring 
continued sustainable income for society. This is, of 
course, easier said than done. 
Conclusion 
In attempting to integrate economics, ecology and equity 
considerations, there are limits to what the discipline of 
economics can achieve. At the highest level the 
fundamental issues of intra and intergenerational equity 
are beyond the realms of economics. They are ethical 
issues, the resolution of which will depend on 
community acceptance of principles developed by 
informed debate. 
In the not too distant past economists were philosophers 
and many had an understanding of how economics 
related to the natural world. Issues we discuss today 
under the heading of sustainable development were · 
foremost in the minds of some of these thinkers in an era 
when the explosion of knowledge had not occurred and 
the disciplines had not split Today. an immediate task 
is to build links, and importantly. an understanding 
between those practising in the relevant disciplines. 
Allow me to conclude by summarising what sustainable 
development is not. My sources for these views are the 
three major works I have refered to. 
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First, sustainable development is not anti-growth. In 
fact, Brundtland calls for growth wilhin the ultimate 
constraints of lhe environment Pearce et al (1990) 
argue that, contrary to lhe old-fashioned view that there 
was a dichotomy, societies can achieve both growth and 
environmental objectives - up to a limit All three works 
argue for a qualitative change in growth. In this regard 
they are not at odds wilh the founders of neo-classical 
welfare economics who defmed economic efficiency 
very broadly, some arguing there is no economic 
efficiency wilhout explicit incorpomtion of distribution. 
Daly and Cobb (1989) take this perspective further, 
based on a particular ethical stance. It is conceivable 
that similar conclusions could be dmwn by olhers 
holding radically different ethical positions. 
Second, sustainable development is not anti-market. It 
recognises the ability of lhe market to galher and sort out 
an enormous amount of information. It recognises lhe 
incentive system of profit and consumer satisfaction 
maximisation can work for lhe common good. Alllhree 
sources have concerns, some quite serious, about the 
actual workings of the market. They call for the market 
to be perfected - by internalising externalities, such as 
pollution, by correcting for monopoly power, and by 
eliminating government interventions which do not 
correct market failure and may in fact exacerbate it 
Either explicitly or implicitly there is a call to address 
the distributional consequences of market-determined 
allocation of income. This mises the question of how 
this is to be done. What principles should apply? These 
are, of course, not new questions. 
What sustainable development does is make society face 
age old questions of political and economic philosophy. 
Maybe, just maybe, we can make progress. To succeed 
we will need to rekindle an interest - not only by 
political and community leaders, but within lhe world 
community - in elhics. 
This is an abridged version of a paper delivered to the 
1991 Economic Society of Australia Conference, Hobart. 
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